


NOTES ON SESSION 5 (24.11.2008)

ERRATA: The former session Notes included a bunch of tree representations; these are somewhat incorrect. [Comp, C] is, of course IP/TP, making the tree in UndMin: 61 (88) into an adjunction construction. This happens along the lines given in



the tree below: I'm sorry that I did get this wrong, but I am only a human computational system. Only under these conditions makes the **Extension Condition** any sense. Chomsky's

notorious "Ks" target root syntactic objects and extend them via the operation *Merge*. The **Extension Condition** only holds in overt syntax, not in covert movement in LF. Adjunction seems to be an exception.

After we discussed some of the arguments against DS, we can now move on to see what kinds of arguments exist that would make abandoning SS possible. Again it is highly advisable to go into **Hornstein et al. (2005)**, especially their chapter labelled *Rethinking S-Structure*. It is always enlightening to see how ordered thoughts can be arrayed – with hindsight and historical perspective.

To me, the crucial thing seems to be that **Case Assignment is steadily replaced by Feature Checking**. Recall that in GB, case was supposed to be assigned in SS. As it stands now, Case is checked on the lexical element and then deletes – since we are Adger-ridden this should seem familiar to us by now, only that it was not that kind of mainstream in 1993. On page 27 in Chomsky (1993), he seems to take sides with the following interpretation of the lexical item α :

The other approach is to take α to have inflectional features in the lexicon as an intrinsic property (in the spirit of lexicalist phonology); these features are then checked against the inflectional element I in the complex [α I]. (MPLT: 27)

The rest is quite familiar: If the features match, they check and delete, if they don't the derivation will crash.

Another important point that comes with Case assignment is that it seems to be "transmitted" somehow. It is unclear how the actual process of Case acquisition could happen. This is given explicitly on page 29 in UndMin:

The standard mechanics of Case Theory in GB thus assumes (i) that on lexical insertion DPs have no case and (ii) that Case is acquired through the course of the derivation. The alternative assumption now is that the lexical items are taken from the lexicon as **full-fledged items marked for Case**. The upshot in terms of the economy principle is that this process decreases the burden which is placed on assignment operations.¹

We reached something like the middle of Michael's Notes (p. 3); In Chomsky, we reached p. 28 and I for my part got stuck a bit with "**Baker's Mirror Principle**". Since Chomsky seems to place some emphasis on this Principle, it would be good to know what it is.

Baker's Mirror Principle

The core references seem to be:

- **BAKER, MARK C. (1985):** "The Mirror Principle and Morphosyntactic Explanation". In: *Linguistic Inquiry*, Vol. 16: 373-416.
- **BAKER, MARK C. (1988):** *Incorporation. A Theory of Grammatical Function Changing*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

I found a review of Baker (1988):

- **DELFITTO, DENIS (1989):** "Review of Baker (1988)". In: *GAGL: Groninger Arbeiten zur germanistischen Linguistik* - Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. Vol. 30: 216-228.

Let me go through this review.

One of Baker's core theses appears to be the rejection of the **Strong Lexicalist Hypothesis**, according to which syntax does not have access to the internal structure of words. This is explicitly formulated in Anderson (1988: 165)². He writes:

Lexicalist Hypothesis:

The syntax neither manipulates nor has access to the internal form of words.

With Baker's **Mirror Principle** the Lexicalist Hypothesis is countered. One could phrase the Mirror Principle such as follows:

¹ I know we had it many times, but just once more: *The burden is now on the lexicon*. As far as I understood from the Chomsky text, he does not say all too much on this issue. The lexical organization into sub-arrays will, I believe become relevant in a later stage of theory development.

² **ANDERSON, STEPHEN R. (1988):** "Morphological Theory". In: **NEWMAYER, FREDERICK J. (ED.):** *Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey. Vol. 1: Linguistic Theory: Foundations*. Cambridge: CUP: 146-191.

Mirror Principle:

The order of the affixes in a complex word not only reflects the order of the processes in its *lexical* derivation, but also the order of the syntactic processes to which they correspond. (see Delfitto 1989: 218)

The assumption that lexical items are atoms (Atomicity Thesis³) that can not be “looked into” by the syntax is abandoned. Syntax is now considered to feed the morphological component of the grammar.

The arguments that lead Baker to this emendation of the atomicity assumption are complex and I am not really able to outline them in a manner that would show I understood them. Baker builds his argument around complex terms to be found in the Chomsky of the 1980s: *Minimality Condition, Visibility Requirement, Government Transparency Corollary*, just to name three.


It seems to me that the rules working on the syntactic level also – somehow in analogy – work on the level of the individual lexical item. Generally, Delfitto’s review is an appraisal of Baker’s monograph.

Once we assume that complex interactions are going on between the syntax and morphology, it becomes easy to see how a **feature-checking approach** may be developed. The arguments against SS become stronger if SS does not have the function of assigning Case. The only thing we now need is a Case Filter inbuilt into LF:

So, if we replace assignment with checking and assume that the Case Filter applies at LF (something like, “by LF all Cases must be appropriately checked”), then all goes swimmingly even without SS. (UndMin: 30)

In Chomsky, the Case Filter is interpreted as an interface condition at LF and all morphological features must be checked somewhere for convergence. To have its Case checked at LF is a sound argument for another phenomenon: covert syntax – in this case this means covert movement in LF.⁴ Let me take the notoriously well-known sentence *There is a cat on the mat*. Intuitively, the canonical, so to speak, version would be: *A cat is*

on the mat. Also clear should be that the DP *a cat* is nominative in this case. In the existential construction, however, *there is* is clearly “un-casey”, it simply does not receive anything like case. Where could it be? In the deictic element *there*? This seems highly unlikely. The DP has to



get its Case from somewhere. The non-SS assumption now is that it

does so covertly in LF, checking its case against IP in an adjunction configuration. This instance of covert movement is given above. I indicated [Nom] on Infl just to show that the DP can check its Case there. The [Nom] feature of Infl is projected throughout the adjunction process. Hornstein et al. say that the DP needs to be in some government relation to Infl. I do not know whether this later becomes something like feature valuation (from top down) or if mere adjunction is enough to check [Nom] properly.

What matters is that this movement is not visible by PF – it has no phonetic reflex, it is not transmitted to the A-P system and thus only relevant to the C-I system via LF, being now a legitimate object at LF.

³ I wonder what Fodor would say to this. As far as I understand him, words (i.e. lexemes) are atoms – this means indivisible, containing the nucleus of the meaning as a strict unit.

⁴ As Benni, I think, correctly remarked: (Almost) all the movements in LF are covert. Question: Which movements are overt in LF, or is LF syntax exclusively covert syntax?