

At every step of the derivation, the moved heads are properly governed by the heads into which incorporation is to be done. The circles indicate that with each incorporation, the moved subhead material grows in amount. A question arises: Since the analysis given still deals with simple NPs, **would it pose a problem in more recent analyses if the NP was really a DP with an empty D (Ø)? Would the N then first have to incorporate into D and then into P?** Anyhow, Hale/Keyser view the HMC as a special case of the Empty Category Principle, which is:


(4) Empty Category Principle
[e] (an empty category) must be properly governed.

One of the general theoretical aims is to restrict the range of theoretically possible incorporations. Why is it that a sentence such as (5) is impossible in English?

(5) * It machined the wine into bottles. (*paraphrase*: A machine got the wine into bottles. A machine bottled the wine.)

In (5), a subject is incorporated into the V and not a complement. The result will be that the **subject is external to the VP**. Why is (6) so strange, though we have structures such as *take sth. over*, *turn sth. on* etc.

(6) He bottled the wine in. (*paraphrase*: He put the wine in bottles. He bottled the wine.)



The tree is provided here. It is here the following case:

“The preposition is a ‘closer governor,’ defining PP as the minimal governing domain for the trace” (p. 61).³


Please always remind yourself of the importance of **finding constraints on possible structures**. If we could show that crosslinguistically, things such as barriers pose constraints on possible argument structures, then we could be on to something.

Θ-roles and Argument Structure

Two of Hale/Keyser’s central questions are **why are there so few thematic roles and why assume UTAH?** With this, they take a critical stance towards Baker (1988) and his **Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis**. Perhaps, one could do without UTAH in the sense that it would be derivable from (i) the lexical categories we have in language (here chiefly N, V, A, P) and (ii) projections of syntactic structure. For projections to be unambiguous, it is necessary for them to be binary.⁴ Now, what is striking is that Hale/Keyser say that there **essentially are no Θ-roles**. To this simple tree, they say the following:

“While we might assign a particular thematic label – say, “agent” – to the NP [...], its grammatical status is determined entirely by the relation(s) it bears in the relational structure projected by lexical head V” (p. 68).

To make it short: **Relations determine thematic structures**. Once the



³ This is to be found in Chomsky’s (1986) *Barriers*.

⁴ They follow a concept by Larson called the *Single Complement Hypothesis*. Head-complement relations are to be biunique.

NP is in a specific relational position, here [Spec, VP], and this position is determined unambiguously, then it occupies the room of one and only one thematic role. They go on in that they say:

“That the list of thematic role terms is not endless or even large follows, we claim, from the fact (if it is a fact) that the roles are derivative of lexical syntactic relations, and these are limited in the manner we have described” (p. 69).

I will here leave out some part of their discussion, which mainly deals with the question of whether unergative constructions such as *The clown laughed* have the subject generated in the embedded VP or if it is directly generated as an external argument in [Spec, _{matrix}VP].⁵ The two fundamental defining principles that determine the relation among the arguments of a verb are:

(7) Lexical Relational Structure (Argument Structure)

- (a) **Unambiguous projection**
- (b) **Full Interpretation**


Unfortunately for my understanding, on p. 78 Hale/Keyser say once more that in a structure such as *The child laughed*, the subject is generated directly in [Spec, IP]. Subjects of unergative verbs are “truly external”, as their parlance goes. Of course, if *the child* is so external to the VP, then how does it relate to the verb at all? *The child* is understood as an “agent” and:

“How, then, do we account for the fact that the external subjects of unergative and causative verbs, say, are understood as ‘agents’ in relation to the events named by those verbs? How is the ‘agent role’ assigned” (p. 81)?

To shorten their argument, an answer to this riddle could be to say that in the above case *the child* is indeed an internal argument to the VP. Again, I will leave out some argument on *splash* and *smear* verbs.⁶

Output

Critical opinions towards **Lexical Relations Structure** representations (LRSs) have questioned the real need of this distinct representational level. Where, in the overall system of, presumably, the C_{HL} does LRS have its place? Hale/Keyser’s general reply is that LRS is a lexical phenomenon. The lexical entry for, say *shelve* includes **the whole syntactic structure**, as shown here. I see here some type of **dynamic changes in the conception of the lexicon**. If I understand Hale/Keyser correctly,



⁵ They say that the subject of unergative constructions is generated in [Spec, IP], which I do not understand. More modern perspectives locate it in [Spec, vP]. This passage was somewhat confusing.

⁶ Cf. the following:

Tr.: We **dripped** honey on the cornbread. Intr.: Honey **dripped** on the cornbread.

A change in transitivity is possible here, though not in these examples:

Tr.: They **daubed** pipeclay on their bodies. Intr.: *Pipeclay **daubed** on their bodies.

Hale/Keyser call this a “manner component” (p. 90). They say that the difference of these two verb classes lies within the principles according to which the manner component is licensed. The manner component has an LRS reflex. This looks somewhat made-up to me.

then syntactic rules apply at the level of the lexicon – or at some yet clearly to be defined interface between syntax and the lexicon. Hale/Keyser leave this particular to empirical investigation. Though one difference between lexical and syntactic representations should be outlined: In 1993, structures such as *shelf* did not include any functional categories. So movement processes in the 1993 version of LRS were considered different from movements in “real” syntactic environments that included functional projections.⁷ So the **causative was considered to be a substantial lexical entity**. In Papago,⁸ e.g., we find **overt causative morphology** such as in (8):

- (8) bisk-cud “cause to sneeze”
 ‘i’ihog-cud “cause to cough”

This might indicate that we find this causative structure in *every* structure, just that it is morphophonologically null. Hale/Keyser say: “To all intents and purposes, the nonovert causative is simply ‘not there’” (103).

An open question is to me still: What do Hale/Keyser mean by predication. There must be at least a double-usage of this term. There seems to be **internal predication**, which happens internal to the VP, and **external predication**, which takes place when an “truly external” argument is merged, e.g., directly into [Spec, IP].

⁷ Today, the causative light verb *v* is conceptualized as a functional projection. Or something in between – this is hardly to be backed up.

⁸ A native American language spoken in south central Arizona. Around 11.000 native speakers (1990). The official name is *Tohono O’odam*. Belongs to the Uto-Aztecan language family. Source: <http://www.ethnologue.com/>.