



= a split CP

### 1. The fine structure of C(P)

In analogy to the split of V and I into more articulated structures, C received a split-analysis as well. Although occasional proposals as to the existence of more than one position/head at the left edge of the clause date back at least to the late 1980s, it is only with **Rizzi (1997)** that an adequate articulate structure of a C split into several **discourse-related categories** was introduced. The split-analysis of C represents one particular minimalist approach to syntax that is referred to as the **cartographic** theory (cf. Cinque 2002, Belletti 2004a, Rizzi 2004; Haegeman is a cartographer, too). Within this approach, prolific syntactic domains (DP, VP, IP, CP) comprise a rich number of functional projections, each of which accommodates a syntactically and semantically coherent type of constituent (fronted elements, adverbs, aspectual elements). More conservative approaches, in contrast, tend to blur the differing nature of constituents, rather pursuing strategies that simply adjoin a given constituent to V, T, or C.


Rizzi (1997) motivated the split of C by the fact that more than one constituent can be fronted to C, and, moreover, that multiple fronted constituents of different sorts (complementisers, topics, foci, etc.) show a hierarchical ordering relative to each other. This gave rise to the following simplified hierarchy of the split C.

#### (1) **Force > (Top) > (Foc) > Fin**

The highest projection Force hosts clause-typing operators and, in embedded sentences, finite Cs like *that* or *whether*. Force is the interface to the higher context (i.e. the matrix clause or discourse). The low projection Fin(iteness) hosts non-finite Cs like *for*. It is the interface to the propositional TP in its scope. The topic/focus field sandwiched between Force and Fin is optional, as indicated by the brackets. Should there be neither any topical, nor any focal element, the topic/focus field can be inactivated (i.e. the split CP is syncretised into an unsplit C). The following examples are taken to underpin the hierarchy posited in (1).

- (2) a. (*minimal context*: He had always kissed the wrong girls.) He hoped that girls like those, never again would he kiss.

b.



First, the complex negative adverb *never again* is focalised to [Spec,FocP]<sup>1</sup>, triggering negative inversion of T/*would* to Foc. Then, the direct object *girls like those*, which is identified as familiar information by the minimal context in (2), is topicalised to [Spec,TopP]. Notice that the inversed Top/Foc order (\*...*that never again, girls like those, would he kiss*) yields an ungrammatical structure (or, at best, a marginally acceptable/felicitous one). Also, the fact that Top/Foc precede non-finite C *for*, but follow the finite C *that*, further supports the hierarchy.

- (3) a. I hope  $that_{Force}$ , tomorrow,  $TP[John\ will\ leave\ ~~tomorrow~~]$ .  
 b. \*I hope  $for_{Fin}$ , tomorrow,  $TP[John\ to\ leave\ ~~tomorrow~~]$ .

(cf. Rizzi 1997:301)

- (4) *minimal context*: What was the advice given by the police to the general public?  
 a. Under no circumstances  $for_{Fin}$   $TP[anyone\ to\ approach\ the\ escaped\ convicts]$ .  
 b.  $That_{Force}$  under no circumstances should  $TP[anyone\ approach\ the\ escaped\ convicts]$ .

(cf. Radford 2006:215)

While English examples involving multiple fronted material might appear a bit contrived, it is not unusual for other languages to have multiple topics/foci, e.g. French (the following example is attested to have occurred in natural discourse).

- (5) [L'homme]<sub>i</sub> [cette femme-là]<sub>j</sub> [mon livre]<sub>k,il</sub> le<sub>k</sub> lui<sub>j</sub> a donné.  
 the man that woman-there my book he it to her has given  
 'The man he GAVE my book to that woman.'

(adapted from Lambrecht 2001)

## 2. Force

Given that the concept of **force** is closely associated with the notion of **sentence type** (not identical with it, though), it is essential to sketch the theoretical status of the sentence as a typological unit in generative linguistics. Foremost, this is a matter of providing a clearly defined terminological basis to proceed along, for the terminology concerning sentence types is rather vague and sometimes even contradictory (cf. Lohnstein 2006:3-6). Sadock & Zwicky (1985:155), a (if not *the*) reference work on the topic, define sentence types as a “coincidence of grammatical structure and conventional conversational use”. In other words, sentence types are pairings of a particular pragmatic meaning, i.e. an **illocutionary force** corresponding to a speech act (cf. e.g. Austin 1962), with a particular morpho-

<sup>1</sup> The conception behind topicalised/focalised elements targeting the *specifier* of Top/Foc, and not Top/Foc itself, is related to cross-linguistic variation. In a topic-prominent language like Japanese, for example, Top itself is realised as (or occupied by) the morphological topic marker *wa*, that marks a DP in its specifier as topic.

syntactic<sup>2</sup> sentential form, the **clause type** proper. This mapping is mediated by the **sentence mood** of a clause (alternatively, somewhat confusingly, **sentential Force**; note the upper-case *F*). In an English *wh*-question, for instance, interrogative sentence mood, which denotes (approximately) a proposition containing one variable element with an unknown referent, is the syntactic translation of a request for information (interrogative illocutionary force), producing a clause type that involves the fronting of a *wh*-element (among other formal aspects). The combination of these three components yields the sentence type *question*. It should be noted that all these notions are rarely kept apart.

What should be excluded from a genuinely syntactic discussion of sentence types are **indirect speech acts**, i.e. the use of a particular sentence form to perform a speech act that is not conventionally associated with that form. Thus, the clause type of a sentence like *Why don't you have some more tea?* might be syntactically interrogative, but it certainly is not intended as a request for information (i.e. a question), but rather as an illocutionary offer or a polite order<sup>3</sup>. However, since indirect speech acts should be in the scope of a genuinely **pragmatic theory** of language<sup>4</sup>, I will take into consideration only the canonical mapping of one illocutionary force to a specific semantic mood (e.g. request for information > interrogative) – **grammaticalised speech acts**. Accordingly, at least three sentence types may be considered well established in linguistic theory<sup>5</sup>: the declarative, the interrogative and the imperative, each of which is associated with a characteristic illocutionary force (assertive, interrogative and directive, respectively). The validity of other sentence types beyond the three just mentioned, e.g. exclamatives, is hotly debated<sup>6</sup>.

Given that illocutionary force should be treated as external to syntax, the question is how exactly sentence mood is syntactically represented/encoded, or, put differently, where illocutionary force enters syntax. A classic observation by Frege (1918) with respect to the relationship between sentence mood and clause type is that the proposition of a clause can remain constant when transformed into another clause type.

- (6) a. John drinks beer. – *declarative*  
 b. Does John drink beer? – *interrogative*  
 c. proposition (simplified): 'John drink beer.'

From this, he concluded that (in declarative sentences) there must exist some element in addition to the proposition, which he identifies as the assertoric force (*behauptende Kraft*) of the sentence<sup>7</sup>. Adopting this idea, many lin-

<sup>2</sup> Abstracting away from phonological-intonational aspects.

<sup>3</sup> Which, in turn, is prototypically realised by an imperative clause type, i.e. *Have some more tea!*

<sup>4</sup> Indirect speech acts are not categorically incompatible with generative linguistics. Relevance Theory (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1986), a pragmatic theory sharing the fundamental assumptions with generative linguistics (modularity, etc.), has produced accounts of indirect speech acts principally in compliance with minimalist syntax (e.g. Wilson & Sperber 1988; Lenci 1994; Jary 2004).


<sup>5</sup> Indeed, Sadock & Zwicky's (1985) cross-linguistic study of sentence typology confirms the (quasi-) universal status of these three types.

<sup>6</sup> As to exclamatives, for instance, König & Siemund (2005) analyse them as a mere combination of interrogative and declarative, while Zanuttini & Portner (2003) argue (convincingly, in my view) to count exclamatives as a proper sentence type.

<sup>7</sup> To my knowledge, the force (*Kraft*) of Frege (1918) applied to propositions (i.e. sentence mood), and not to utterances (i.e. illocutionary force). This would come as no surprise, for the notion of force was only adopted to pragmatic theory during the pragmatic turn of the 1960s/70s as illocutionary force/point (cf. Austin 1975). Subsequently, the semantic notion of sentence mood was explicitly separated from illocutionary force only by Davidson (1979), in discussing indirect speech acts. Confusingly, early pragmatically oriented works (Game Theory; cf. Wittgenstein 1953, Stenius 1967) referred to what was to be known as illocutionary force by the term mood as well ( $\neq$  sentence mood as defined here).

guists/philosophers subsequently argued that sentences be partitioned into two parts, one corresponding to the semantic/pragmatic force, and the other to the proposition of a sentence.

(7)



(adapted from Lohnstein 2006:3)

In more recent generative theory it has been proposed that sentence mood, or, in other terms, sentential Force, is syntactically represented in the domain above TP, i.e. the C-domain, in the functional category Force (cf. Cheng 1991, Chomsky 1995, Rizzi 1997), encoding illocutionary force as covert clause-typing particles/operators representing sentential Force/mood (i.e. [**iForce:decl/imper/interrog**]).

### 3. Root vs. embedded contexts

Last time around, we closed off the session by addressing ('debating' would be an exaggeration) the issue whether embedded clauses contain force, or, put syntactically, whether they are headed by a projection Force(P). Provided that sentential Force is the syntactic translation of illocutionary force, the question arises as to the status of the projection Force in embedded contexts: Do embedded clauses contain illocutionary/sentential force? Spontaneously, one would probably not want to deny an embedded clause like the following its interrogative status: *She asks [how many Doppelbocks he had]* (too many). After all, the indirect question is paraphrasable as *How many Doppelbocks did he have?*. Given that the sentential Force of a clause is to be construed as a clause-typing operator (or a set of operators), which eventually yields the common sentence types, it seems odd that embedded clauses should differ considerably from their root counterpart formally – a state of affairs that is at least undesirable, since non-generalised. With the above question (pair) as an example, the following issues come to mind.

1. Whereas some [+Q]-operator induces subject-auxiliary inversion in the main question, this does not happen in the embedded version.
2. An often neglected aspect of sentence types is their intonational contour. Given
3. From a pragmatic perspective: While the root question is associated with a direct interrogative speech act, this is less evident with the embedded question, which is embedded into a speech act of assertion (as indirect speech).
4. The embedded question stands in a selectional relation with a selecting matrix predicate, while the root question is an unselected object (only governed by a higher order context, i.e. discourse, in the broad sense).
5. The interrogative semantics of the embedded question is overtly indicated by the matrix predicate *ask* (it's a speech act verb), while that of the main question is constructed by various grammatical means interacting (question intonation, fronting of a *wh*-constituent,...). ...

What these differences suggest is that the force-related category differs according to the root vs. embedded distinction. Although the by now classic reference as to the split-CP hypothesis, Rizzi (1997), does not make a difference

between root and embedded contexts, a footnote reveals that Rizzi himself is aware of the problem (cf. Rizzi 1997:328, fn. 6).

An alternative is suggested by Bhatt and Yoon's (1991) distinction between type markers (our Force heads) and simple *subordinators*, heads which make a clause available for (*categorial*) *selection independently of its force*. If this proposal is combined with ours, a tripartite system would result (subordinator, Force, Finiteness).

This observation was, for instance, taken up by Haegeman (2006) in her treatment of adverbial subclauses. This would mean that the Hierarchy of Projections must be extended by a head Sub superseding Force. As it turns out, embedded and root clauses differ in the availability of Sub and Force (whatever availability is supposed to mean: lack, deficient category, inactive category, etc.). This is in line with the classic observation that a subset of embedded clauses *does* allow for Main Clause Phenomena (MCP; cf. Hooper & Thompson 1973), e.g. the complement clauses to factive predicates like *know*. How all this extends to non-finite clausal complements remains to be made explicit...